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The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the program instituted in 1976 that
allows developing countries to export thousands of products to the United States duty-
free, is an important element of U.S. eﬀorts to promote economic growth in the de-
veloping world. However, since the program’s inception U.S. tariﬀ rates have fallen
signiﬁcantly, thus potentially reducing the ability of the GSP program to encourage
U.S. imports from beneﬁciary countries. This paper estimates the impact of U.S. tariﬀ
reductions on imports from the developing world using a panel of import data from
76 countries and 2,389 GSP-eligible products between 1998 and 2001. It ﬁnds that
reductions in U.S. tariﬀ rates have diminished imports from developing countries sig-
niﬁcantly, although some countries have been impacted more than others.
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11 Introduction
The United States ushered in a new era in development assistance with the establish-
ment of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program in 1976. The program, which
eliminates duties on thousands of products from developing countries, was intended to pro-
mote economic growth in the developing world through “trade, not aid.” Since its inception,
the program has been a small but important part of the U.S. development assistance strategy.
The GSP program currently accounts for 1.6 percent of total U.S. imports and approximately
10 percent of imports from GSP-eligible countries.
Like customs unions, part of the growth in imports that occurs due to preferential trade
programs like the GSP program is caused by “trade diversion.” In other words, the tariﬀ
reduction on products under the GSP program reduces the U.S. price of products from
eligible beneﬁciary countries; as a result, imports from developing countries increase as U.S.
consumers both increase consumption and substitute products produced by the developing
world for domestically-produced goods (trade-creation) and other industrialized countries
(trade-diversion). Economists believe that the welfare eﬀects of preferential tariﬀ programs
increase with the amount of trade-creation, but fall with the amount of trade-diversion as
consumers substitute products from less-eﬃcient producers for those produced by more-
eﬃcient producers.
However, since the inception of the GSP program U.S. tariﬀ rates have gradually fallen
due to global trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO). In fact, between
1997 and 2001 alone the average U.S. tariﬀ rate on GSP-eligible products fell from 3.9 to 3.4
percent. As tariﬀ rates have fallen, so has the artiﬁcial comparative advantage granted to
developing countries under the GSP program. While this may decrease the trade diversion
eﬀects of the program, thus theoretically reducing the negative welfare impact of the program
on the U.S. economy, it may also dramatically reduce imports from developing countries.
At the same time that U.S. tariﬀs on GSP-eligible products fell from 3.9 to 3.4 percent, the
already small share of U.S. imports of these products from developing countries fell by 26.4
2percent, from 1.8 to 1.4 percent.
This paper estimates the impact of U.S. tariﬀ reductions on imports from the developing
world using a panel of U.S. import data from 76 countries and 2,389 GSP-eligible products
between 1998 and 2001. It ﬁnds that a 1 percent reduction in U.S. tariﬀ rates on GSP-eligible
products decreases imports from developing countries by over 0.6 percent. Not surprisingly, it
is the countries that currently beneﬁt the most from the program that experience the largest
loss in trade due to a decrease in U.S. tariﬀs. The results have important implications for
the future of the GSP program, as well as U.S. development assistance strategies.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section [2] includes a brief history
and review of the GSP program, as well as a discussion of the theoretical impact of tariﬀ
reductions on imports from countries enjoying preferential duties and a review of historical
empirical studies on the impact of the GSP program on import levels. Section [3] discusses
the empirical model and data used in the estimation, and Section [4] presents the empirical
results. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Preferential Tariﬀs and the GSP Program
During the 1964 and 1968 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), industrialized countries agreed to award preferential tariﬀ treatment to the
manufacturing exports of developing countries. In the United States, these preferential
tariﬀs were implemented in 1976 under the name the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP).
At the time of implementation, the United States eliminated tariﬀs on approximately
3,000 eight-digit harmonized system (HS) tariﬀ-line items for 138 beneﬁciary developing
countries and territories. Today, duty-free entry is available for approximately 4,650 products
from 144 beneﬁciary countries and territories. Each year the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) accepts petitions to add or eliminate eligible articles, although certain products are
statutorily banned from eligibility from the GSP program, including textiles, footwear and
3other “import-sensitive” products. The USTR also reviews the beneﬁciary status of speciﬁc
countries. Countries are graduated from the GSP program when the country’s GNP per
capita exceeds the threshold for high-income countries determined by the World Bank, or
when the United States deems that the country is no longer a developing country. As of
2003, this high income threshold was $9,386.1 In addition, countries can lose preferential
status for speciﬁc products under the competitive need provisions of the GSP program. If
imports from an individual country exceed 50 percent or more of total U.S. imports of that
product, or if imports exceed a designated threshold ($120 million in 2005), then the product
is excluded from GSP eligibility.
An additional 1,770 products are designated eligible only for the 38 countries designated
as least developed beneﬁciary countries (LDBC), or those countries whose GNP per capita is
less than $786. Least developed countries are also exempt from competitive need limitations.
In 2000, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) expanded GSP-beneﬁts for
countries in sub-Saharan Africa to include an additional 1,200 products, including many of
the import-sensitive products described above.
The GSP program continues to be a relatively small preferential trade program in the
United States; imports under the program (excluding those products eligible under AGOA)
reached $22.7 billion in 2004. However, for some countries the GSP program plays a much
larger role in their ability to export to the United States. For example, over 70 percent of
U.S. imports from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Equatorial Guinea are under
the GSP program. Leading imports under the GSP program include oil and gas products,
miscellaneous manufactured products, and motor vehicle parts.
However, U.S. tariﬀ rates have declined dramatically since the implementation of the
Uruguay Round trade agreement in 1996. As can be seen in Figure [1] the trade-weighted
average tariﬀ rate on products eligible for the GSP program fell 13.7 percent between 1997
and 2001 following passage of the Uruguay Round, from 3.9 to 3.4 percent.2 Trade statistics
1Note that China has never been eligible for the GSP program.
2This represents the Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariﬀ rate, or the tariﬀ rate imposed upon most U.S.
trading partners not eligible for any preferential trade programs.
4suggest that this decrease in tariﬀ rates may have reduced imports under the GSP program,
and thus imports from developing countries in general. During this same time period, the
share of GSP-eligible products imported under the GSP program fell by 26.4 percent, from
1.8 percent to only 1.4 percent, as can be seen in Figure [2].3 The share of U.S. imports
from other countries enjoying preferential tariﬀ status also decreased during this time period.
For example, the United State’s North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partners
accounted for 19.8 percent of U.S. imports of GSP-eligible products in 1998, but only 17.2
percent in 2001. As discussed below, part of this decrease may be due to a gradual decline
in the trade diversion impact of the preferential programs as tariﬀs imposed on the rest of
the world decrease.
2.1 Preferential Tariﬀs and Trade Diversion
Like the establishment of a regional trade agreement, the granting of tariﬀ preferences
to developing countries can result in both trade-creation and trade-diversion eﬀects, as ﬁrst
introduced by Viner (1950). Consider the U.S. demand for imports of a particular product
from a developing country and industrialized country, as illustrated in Figures [3] a and
b, respectively. Imports from the two countries are considered imperfect substitutes due to
quality and other characteristics. Moreover, for simplicity I assume that both the developing
and industrialized country supply curves are perfectly elastic. The elimination of tariﬀs only
on GSP-eligible ﬁrms results in an increase in imports from these countries of area gkmj.
While part of this increase can be traced to an increase in total imports as imports substitute
for domestic production, part is diverted from non-GSP eligible countries. The decrease in
price of products from GSP-eligible countries causes a decrease in demand for other nations
products from DROW75 to DROW97/01, and a resulting decrease in imports of aefd.
3It should be noted that part of this decline could be due to the uncertainty surrounding the program
during this time period. Between 1997 and 2001, the U.S. GSP program expired three times for periods
ranging from two to nearly six months. The program was always renewed retroactively, however, and duties
returned to those businesses importing under the GSP program during the expiration period.
5Now consider what happens when tariﬀs decline due to multilateral trade negotiations.
The decrease in price of products from non-GSP eligible countries causes an increase in
imports of area abcd. However, this price decrease also causes the demand for products
from GSP-eligible countries to fall from DGSP75/97 to DGSP01 and a decrease in imports
equal to area ghij. The extent of the decrease will depend on the degree of substitution
between products from developing and industrialized countries, as well as the import demand
elasticity.
2.2 Literature Review
Since the passage of the GSP program, several methods have been used to estimate
the trade and welfare eﬀects of the program and some have tried to simulate the impact of
reductions in tariﬀs on imports under the program. Most methods can fall into one of two
categories: ex ante studies which try to study the potential impact of the program prior
to its implementation and ex post studies which try to isolate the eﬀect of the preferential
tariﬀ treatment on actual trade ﬂows. One of the earliest studies, Baldwin and Murray
(1977), estimates the impact of the GSP program using a partial-equilibrium model in which
imports from beneﬁciary countries are imperfect substitutes for products from industrialized
countries and production from all countries is characterized by perfectly elastic supply curves.
They predict a 27 percent increase in trade ﬂows following implementation of the U.S. GSP
program.4 They estimate that approximately 80 percent of this expansion would be explained
by trade creation, with the remainder explained by trade diversion. Baldwin and Murray
also simulate the change in beneﬁts that would occur with a 50 percent decrease in MFN
tariﬀs; they calculate that a decrease in preferences for GSP-covered items would reduce
trade ﬂows by approximately 10 percent from the baseline estimates. However, the authors
point out that this decrease would be more than oﬀset by the beneﬁts developing countries
would get from the reduction of tariﬀs on non-GSP eligible products.
4Baldwin and Murray also estimates the impact of the implementation of programs in the European
Community and Japan.
6Following Baldwin and Murray, a number of studies criticized the Baldwin and Murray
approach, claiming that the trade diversion eﬀects of the GSP were underestimated and the
conclusion that developing countries would beneﬁt more from MFN tariﬀ cuts than they lose
was questionable. For example, Pomfret (1986) notes that Baldwin and Murray overestimate
trade creation because foreign export supply elasticities are less than inﬁnite and because
of questionable assumptions regarding the cross-price eﬀects. In contrast, Beckmann (1987)
notes that the Baldwin-Murray assumption that price elasticity of demand for the product
group is zero actually overestimates trade diversion. As noted in MacPhee and Ogulego
(1991), ex ante studies conducted shortly after the establishment of the U.S. program typi-
cally estimate that GSP results in an increase in U.S. imports from developing countries of
somewhere between 11 and 64 percent. Part of this wide range can be traced to diﬀerent as-
sumptions regarding the average tariﬀ rates and supply elasticities. In contrast, the general
equilibrium model estimated in Brown (1987) ﬁnds that the GSP program would increase
trade with developing countries by 6 percent; however Brown also ﬁnds that tariﬀ reductions
scheduled to be implemented due to the Tokyo Round would eventually reduce the increase
in imports due to the GSP program by 62 percent.
Many of the ex post studies that utilize actual trade ﬂows following the implementation
of the GSP program ﬁnd relatively small eﬀects of the program. For example, Sapir and
Lundberg (1984) use cross-section regressions of the import market share and growth in
import market shares with the preference margin associated with the GSP program as the
key explanatory variable of interest. They ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant impact of GSP only
on the growth in import market shares; this ﬁnding corresponds to a 15 percent increase in
U.S. imports from beneﬁciary countries between 1975 and 1979 due to the GSP program.
MacPhee and Oguleldo (1991) ﬁnd that the GSP program resulted in a 15 percent growth in
U.S. imports from beneﬁciary countries between 1975 and 1980. Truett and Truett (1997)
estimate an equation of U.S. import demand function for goods from Cyprus, Romania,
Turkey and Yugoslavia with a dummy variable for inclusion in the GSP program and ﬁnd a
positive and signiﬁcant impact on trade for all countries but Yugoslavia. Truett and Truett
7(1993) estimate a similar model using data from Bolivia and Brazil, and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect only in the case of Bolivia. They conclude that the U.S. GSP program has
a greater impact on the export growth of lower-income beneﬁciary countries than more
developed beneﬁciaries. This may be due to the fact that competitive need limitations limit
the usefulness of the program for more developed countries.
However, recently Rose (2004) estimates a gravity model of trade that incorporates a
dummy variable for GSP beneﬁciaries and ﬁnds that extension of GSP beneﬁts from one
country to another has a large positive eﬀect on trade; speciﬁcally, GSP is estimated to
increase trade by over 100 percent.
Other studies have focused on the impact of changes in GSP status for particular products
due primarily to competitive need limitations. MacPhee and Rosenbaum (1989) ﬁnd that
market shares of aﬀected beneﬁciaries fall when tariﬀs increase due to competitive need
limitations but do not rise when tariﬀs decrease. Similarly, Devault (1996) uses both ex ante
and ex post methods and concludes that competitive need limits reduce aﬀected imports by
10 to 17 percent. Moreover, beneﬁts from the import reduction accrue to import competing
domestic ﬁrms.
This paper is the ﬁrst wide ranging ex post study of the impact of general tariﬀ reductions
on imports under the GSP program. Using an extensive product and country-speciﬁc panel of
import data between 1998 and 2001, it uses panel estimation techniques to study the impact
of tariﬀ reductions on U.S. imports from both developing countries and other countries
that currently receive preferential tariﬀ rates. I ﬁnd evidence that tariﬀ reductions have
signiﬁcantly reduced imports from GSP beneﬁciary countries, although some countries have
been impacted more than others.
3 Empirical Model and Data
I estimate the eﬀect of tariﬀ rates on U.S. imports from developing countries using panel
data estimation techniques with product-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, I assume that the
8U.S. imports from country i in product j in year t, yijt can be explained through the equation
yijt = x
0
ijtβ + λt + uj + ijt.
In this equation, xijt includes explanatory variables such as the preferential tariﬀ margin
country i is eligible for and the country’s exchange rate appreciation. The term λt represents
year dummy-variables that capture macroeconomic determinants of U.S. imports as a whole,
uj are the product-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, and β are the parameters to be estimated.5
To construct the dataset, I utilize annual import data from 76 selected countries at the
eight-digit HS product level from the NBER’s U.S. Import, Export and Tariﬀ Database
between 1997 to 2001.6 To ensure consistent results, I include only those products in which
the U.S. imposes an ad valorem tariﬀ.7 I also exclude products which were ineligible for
the GSP program at any point between 1997 and 2001, and imports of particular products
from countries that failed to export that product to the United States in the base year
of 1997. Imports are adjusted for inﬂation using the U.S. Consumer Price Index for all
urban consumers. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced panel of real import data from
76 countries in 2,389 eight-digit HTS lines between 1998 and 2001, for a total of 148,372
observations.8
I merged the resulting dataset with information from the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission’s Tariﬀ Database. This database includes year-speciﬁc information such as the MFN
tariﬀ rate, indicators for preferential trade program eligibility, and program-speciﬁc tariﬀ
5Parameter estimates of the key variables of interest from a random eﬀects model were also similar.
However, Hausman’s test for ﬁxed or random eﬀects indicates that a ﬁxed-eﬀects model is more appropriate
for the estimation.
6In order to include exchange rate ﬂuctuations as an explanatory variable, the dataset includes only those
countries in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Exchange Rate Database. These countries account for
nearly 95 percent of total U.S. imports of GSP-eligible products during the investigation period.
7A one percent reduction in a speciﬁc tariﬀ will likely have a much diﬀerent result than a 1 percent
reduction in ad valorem tariﬀs due to the diﬀerent units of measurement.
8Data limitations prevent a longer sample period; currently, the NBER’s U.S. Import, Export and Tar-
iﬀ Database provides import data only through 2001 while the International Trade Commission’s Tariﬀ
Database provides country-speciﬁc tariﬀ data between 1997 and 2005.
9rates such as those that apply to U.S. trade with Mexico and Canada by eight-digit HS
product line. Using the lists of countries eligible for particular preferential trade programs
that appear in the general notes of the annual Harmonized Tariﬀ Schedule of the United
States, as well as information such as GSP competitive need exclusions from the Tariﬀ
Database, I created a set of dummy variables that indicate whether a speciﬁc country and
product was eligible for special tariﬀ treatment. Using these dummy variables, I assigned a
tariﬀ rate to each country and product. For example, countries eligible for GSP treatment
for a particular product were assigned a duty rate of zero; countries ineligible for any pref-
erential trade program were assigned the normal or MFN tariﬀ rate. The preference margin
for each country was then calculated by subtracting the country-speciﬁc tariﬀ rate from the
MFN tariﬀ rate.
Obviously there are many other factors that inﬂuence import levels other than the tariﬀ
rate. Unfortunately, product-speciﬁc data is unavailable at this high level of disaggregation.
However, I do control for a number of macroeconomic and country-speciﬁc factors. For
example, gravity-equation models of trade have shown time and time again that countries
sharing a border tend to trade more with one another. Moreover, bilateral trade tends to
decrease the further away the trading partners are located and increase with the economic
size of the trading partner. Therefore, I include a dummy variable for trade with Mexico
and Canada (NAFTA eligible country), as well as the log of the distance between the United
States and the country in question. I use distance data calculated by CEPII using the great
circle formula, which utilizes the latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities in
the countries. The World Bank’s World Development Indicators provides the log of the
Real GDP of the each country as a measure of the economic size of the trading partner.
Finally, I hypothesize that developing countries with limited manufacturing capability may
ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to make inroads to the U.S. market. A dummy variable for GSP-eligible
countries should capture this characteristic.
In addition, one would expect U.S. imports from a particular country to increase with
a depreciation of that country’s currency because the country’s products become relatively
10less expensive to U.S. consumers. To control for this possibility, I include the log of the
exporting country’s real annual exchange rate from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
Exchange Rate Dataset. Each country’s exchange rate is normalized by dividing by the
sample average prior to taking the natural log. The exchange rate is deﬁned as the foreign
currency per U.S. dollar, so that an increase in the exchange rate reﬂects a depreciation of the
exporting country’s currency. One might also expect larger amount of imports from countries
with lower costs and, thus, prices. Although the ideal variable would be the relative wage
rate in the trading partner, I proxy the wage rate using the log of the country’s real GDP
per capita, which is derived from data in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
In order to control for the fact that countries with a historically large U.S. market share in
a product will continue to have a competitive advantage in the product, I include the log of
U.S. imports of the product from the country in the base year of 1997.
Finally, all of the results presented below include year-ﬁxed eﬀects to control for macroe-
conomic ﬂuctuations in the United States that would result in a change in imports from all
countries. Table [1] includes summary statistics of all the variables used in the estimation
procedure.
4 Results
Empirical estimates from the equation described above are presented in Table [2]. As
expected, a reduction in the United States’ MFN tariﬀ rates results in a decrease in U.S.
imports of products from countries that enjoy preferential tariﬀ rates. Speciﬁcally, speciﬁ-
cation [1] suggests that a 1 percent reduction in a country’s tariﬀ preference margin results
in a 0.32 percent decrease in U.S. imports of products from the country. This suggests that
the reduction in U.S. tariﬀ rates over the past 30 years has indeed reduced some of the
trade diversion eﬀects of all preferential trade programs, to the detriment of these program’s
beneﬁciaries.
Speciﬁcations [2]-[4] study this result more closely by looking at which countries suﬀer
11the largest decrease in trade from the reduction in MFN tariﬀ rates. The results from speci-
ﬁcation [2] indicate that a 1 percent reduction in MFN tariﬀ rates on GSP-eligible products
reduces U.S. imports from NAFTA beneﬁciaries by approximately 0.2 percent and from mem-
bers of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) by approximately 0.1 percent.9 However,
imports under the GSP program seem to be impacted much more by the reduction in the
preferential tariﬀ margin. The same one percent reduction results in a 0.6 percent reduction
in imports from GSP-eligible countries. This elasticity translates to a 30 percent reduction
in imports due to a 50 percent reduction in U.S. tariﬀ rates, which is much larger than the
10 percent reduction predicted in Baldwin and Murray [1977].10 The parameter estimates
suggest that tariﬀ reductions have had an economically signiﬁcant impact on imports under
the GSP program. Given the reduction in average U.S. tariﬀ rates on GSP-eligible products
between 1997 and 2001, the results imply that imports from GSP beneﬁciaries would have
been 6.5 percent higher in 2001, or $1.0 billion, absent the tariﬀ reductions associated with
the Uruguay Round.
Although the impact of tariﬀ reductions on imports from all developing countries are
signiﬁcant, the reductions may have had disparate impacts on individual developing countries
who utilize the GSP program. Speciﬁcation [3] ﬁnds that a decrease in MFN tariﬀ rates has a
much larger impact on GSP beneﬁciary countries in Asia than other countries.11 Speciﬁcally,
a one percent reduction in MFN tariﬀ rates results in a nearly 0.9 percent decrease in imports
from GSP-beneﬁciary countries in Asia, but only a 0.4 percent decrease in imports from
other beneﬁciaries. This is likely due to the fact that Asian countries reap the lion’s share of
beneﬁts under the GSP program. During the sample period, Asian countries accounted for
nearly 60 percent of total U.S. imports under the GSP program. In contrast, the results from
speciﬁcation [4] show that the reduction in U.S. tariﬀ rates has had no discernible impact on
imports from the poorest countries, or the least developed beneﬁciary countries (LDBCs).
9ATPA countries include Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
10Note, however, that this diﬀerence may be due to dramatic changes in trade policies over the past 30
years, including signiﬁcantly lower MFN tariﬀ rates.
11Asian beneﬁciaries include Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.
12On average, U.S. imports from developing countries are much lower than those from the
rest of the world. Speciﬁcally, U.S. imports from GSP-eligible countries’ were nearly 85
percent less (exp(−1.9)−1) than those from other countries. This is in sharp contrast to the
result in Rose [2004], which found that extending GSP beneﬁts to a particular country raises
bilateral trade by over 100 percent. However, the GSP eﬀect is captured in this research
in the preferential tariﬀ margin, rather than in the GSP dummy variable as employed by
Rose [2004]. Parameter estimates indicate that imports from Canada and Mexico are not
higher than those from other countries once the preferential tariﬀ margin enjoyed by these
countries under NAFTA, as well as other economic factors, are accounted for.
Parameter estimates associated with other control variables are signiﬁcant and of the
expected sign. For example, the empirical results conﬁrm that U.S. imports increase as
the exporting country’s currency depreciates, thus reducing the price in the United States.
Speciﬁcally, a 1 percent depreciation of the exporting country’s currency results in a 0.4
percent increase U.S. imports. U.S. imports from countries characterized by higher per
capita income levels are relatively less than imports from less developed countries. The
results indicate that a 1 percent increase in per capita income level results in a 0.22 percent
decrease in imports. As explained above, this could be explained by the fact that countries
with higher per capita income levels also have higher wage rates and thus higher prices
than less developed countries, thus depressing U.S. imports. Recall that this result is after
controlling for the lower growth rate of GSP-eligible or developing countries in general.
Imports increase the closer the trading partner is to the United States and the larger the
economy of the trading partner, as proxied by the GDP of the country. Not surprisingly,
the results prove that it is important to control for initial import levels from each country.
The estimates show the U.S. imported more from countries with higher base level of imports
during the sample period.
135 Conclusion
The GSP program has been touted as one of the key elements of U.S. eﬀorts to as-
sist developing countries through “trade, not aid” since 1976. Some believe, however, that
reductions in normal U.S. tariﬀ rates over the past 30 years have slowly eroded the tariﬀ
preferences granted to developing countries through this program. Empirical results from
this paper show that tariﬀ reductions have indeed had a large impact on U.S. imports from
developing countries. Speciﬁcally, I ﬁnd that a one percent reduction in MFN tariﬀ rates
on GSP-eligible products results in a 0.6 percent decline in U.S. imports of these products
from the average developing country. Morever, the largest beneﬁciary countries–those in
Asia–experience an even larger decline in imports. Based on these estimates, developing
countries would have had approximately $1.0 billion more in exports to the United States in
2001 if not for the decrease in U.S. tariﬀ rates under the Uruguay Round trade agreement
between 1997 and 2001.
These results do not suggest, however, that developing countries can not signiﬁcantly
beneﬁt from future global trade negotiations that reduce tariﬀ rates around the world. Many
of the products produced by developing countries such as textiles and apparel and agriculture
products are ineligible for the GSP program. Moreover, the results show that a few more
developed countries are reaping the lion’s share of beneﬁts from the GSP program and,
thus, will see the largest declines due to the reduction in tariﬀ margins. However, these
countries are the very ones that are most likely to lose GSP-eligibility due to competitive
need limitations and income thresholds. This research shows that the reduction in preference
margins on GSP-eligible products will have very little impact on trade between the United
States and the poorest developing countries.
This research also suggests that the United States and other industrialized countries may
want to revisit whether the GSP program is the best tool to encourage economic devel-
opment. The large impact that tariﬀ reductions have had on imports from certain GSP
beneﬁciary countries suggests that the GSP program has resulted in a signiﬁcant amount of
14trade diversion to a few, large beneﬁciary countries. However, the program does not appear
to be assisting the poorest countries at all.
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17Figure 1: Average Non-Preferential Tariﬀs of Products Eligible for GSP Program, 1997-2001
18Figure 2: Imports from Preferential Tariﬀ Programs, 1997-2001
19Figure 3: Trade Diversion and Trade Creation
20Table 1: Summary Statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev.
Log(1+Real Imports) 0.00 21.23 8.88 5.12
Log(1+Preference Margin) 0.00 3.30 0.54 0.79
GSP eligible country 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.42
NAFTA Member 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.29
Log per capita GDP 4.82 10.72 9.22 1.28
Log GDP 20.24 29.19 26.55 1.34
Log 1997 imports 5.53 21.16 11.09 2.61
Log Distance 6.31 9.69 8.79 0.70
Log Exchange Rate -1.07 0.39 0.02 0.09
21Table 2: Eﬀect of Diminishing Tariﬀ Rates on GSP Imports
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+Preference Margin) 0.322 0.210 0.204 0.208
(9.61) (4.97) (5.38) (5.46)
Log(1+Preference Margin)*GSP country 0.407 0.191 0.412
(5.78) (2.89) (6.32)




Log(1+Preference Margin)*NAFTA member 0.013
(0.13)
Log(1+Preference Margin)*ATPA member -0.104
(-2.15)
GSP eligible country -1.490 -1.958 -1.858 -1.979
(-24.37) (-19.91) (-19.13) (-20.36)
NAFTA member -0.347 -0.205 -0.352 -0.169
(-4.47) (-1.44) (-4.23) (-2.04)
Log per capita GDP -0.228 -0.230 -0.197 -0.236
(-19.20) (-19.27) (-16.37) (-19.70)
Log GDP 0.816 0.812 0.794 0.807
(85.30) (84.44) (82.50) (84.17)
Log Distance -0.286 -0.291 -0.392 -0.282
(-12.12) (-12.12) (-16.03) (-11.91)
Log Exchange Rate 0.440 0.443 0.323 0.431
(3.18) (3.20) (2.33) (3.11)
Log 1997 imports 0.998 0.997 0.998 0.997
(220.36) (219.60) (220.13) (219.68)
Number of Observations 148,372 148,372 148,372
R-Squared 0.39 0.39 0.39
Regressand: log real imports. Product-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect estimation. Parameter estimated associated with
the constant and year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are not reported. t-statistics in parentheses.
22